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Abstract
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the experience of voluntary control over one’s own actions, and, through them, over events
in the outside world. Recent accounts suggest that SoA involves an integration of various cues. These include prospective
cues, for example, related to the fluency of action selection, and retrospective cues, linked to outcome monitoring. It re-
mains unclear whether these cues may have independent effects on SoA, and, in particular, how their relative contributions
may change during instrumental learning. In the present study, we explored these issues by conducting a multi-study anal-
ysis of seven published and unpublished studies on the role of prospective cues to the SoA. Our main question was how the
effects of selection fluency on SoA might change as information about action–outcome contingencies is gathered. Results
show that selection fluency can have a general and consistent influence on the SoA, independent of outcome monitoring.
This suggests selection fluency is used as a heuristic cue, to prospectively inform our SoA. In addition, our results show that
the influence of selection fluency on SoA may change systematically as action–outcome contingencies are gradually
learned. We speculate that dysfluent selection may impair formation of mental associations between action and outcome.
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Introduction
Our experience of voluntary action is normally accompanied by a
sense of agency (SoA), that is, a feeling that we are in control of our
actions and, through them, of events in the outside world (Haggard
and Tsakiris 2009). Usually, the SoA exists in the background of our
mental lives, but we become especially aware of it when there is a
disruption in the chain of events of voluntary action (Chambon
et al. 2014; Gallagher 2012): SoA emerges from establishing a link
between our intentions, actions, and external outcomes. However,
the details of how these sources inform SoA remain unknown.
Many studies have focused on the role of monitoring the
consequences of our actions. These have shown that an
important aspect of the SoA relies on a comparison between
predicted or expected outcomes and actual action outcomes
(Blakemore et al. 2002; Wegner and Sparrow 2004). Specifically,
when there is a mismatch, the SoA is reduced. While this com-
parison may rely on predictive signals, this process is essen-
tially retrospective, as it depends on knowing the action
outcomes.
Recently, it has been shown that there is also a prospective
contribution to the SoA, based on the metacognitive monitoring
of action selection processes, that is, linking intentions to action
(Chambon et al., 2014). These studies used subliminal priming of
actions to manipulate the ease of action selection in a simple
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agency task (Chambon and Haggard 2012; Chambon et al. 2013,
2015; Sidarus et al. 2013, 2017; Voss et al. 2017; Wenke et al. 2010).
Summarily, participants made a left or right hand action in re-
sponse to a target arrow, and a coloured circle appeared after a
variable delay. Participants then judge how much control they
felt over these circles. Importantly, a prime arrow was briefly
presented just before the target, unbeknownst to the partici-
pants. Action selection was easy when prime and target direc-
tions were congruent; but if the prime was incongruent with the
target, this created a response conflict, which impaired action
selection, leading to slower response times and more errors.
Results showed that incongruently primed actions led to a
lower SoA over action outcomes, than congruently primed ac-
tions (Wenke et al. 2010). Similar effects have also been shown
using supraliminal stimuli (Sidarus and Haggard 2016; Sidarus
et al. 2017; but see Damen et al. 2014). Thus, the fluency, or ease,
of action selection, can inform the SoA prospectively, and long
before the outcome is known.
In the subliminal priming task, participants were not aware
that selection fluency was manipulated, nor did they strategi-
cally decide to use fluency as a cue to agency (Wenke et al. 2010;
Chambon and Haggard 2012). Although the experience of selec-
tion fluency/dysfluency may be relatively weak, people may
have a sense of ‘something going wrong’ in incongruent trials,
even without being able to identify why they have this feeling
(Pacherie 2008; Morsella et al. 2009; Desender et al. 2014). This
feeling could in turn become associated with subsequent
events, such as action outcomes. In fact, response conflict has
been suggested to serve as an aversive signal (Botvinick 2007),
and can lead to more negative judgements of neutral stimuli
(Fritz and Dreisbach 2013).
Importantly, recent models of the SoA emphasize that it in-
volves the integration of multiple signals, which may become
available at different stages of voluntary action (Moore and
Fletcher 2012; Farrer et al. 2013; Synofzik et al. 2013; Chambon
et al. 2014). Monitoring of action selection can provide an initial,
prospective cue to SoA. Forward model predictions about the
outcome can then be compared with the observed outcome
once this becomes available, to retrospectively link action and
outcome.
This raises the question of how prospective and retrospec-
tive cues are integrated. On one view, integration follows the
principles of optimal cue integration (Moore and Fletcher 2012;
Synofzik et al. 2013): cues are weighted based on their reliability,
thus more reliable cues have a stronger influence than less reli-
able cues. Additionally, the weighting of cues may be altered by
prior knowledge, or contextual cues. This approach has previ-
ously proved useful to understanding cue integration in SoA
(Moore and Haggard 2008; Wolpe et al. 2013). Yet, how the
weighting of different cues may change dynamically with expe-
rience, for example, throughout the process of learning new ac-
tion–outcome contingencies, remains poorly understood.
Moreover, it has been suggested that selection fluency may
become a useful cue to SoA because it is predictive of successful
action (Haggard and Chambon 2012; Chambon et al. 2014). Our
main question here was whether using selection fluency as a
cue to SoA may be a general heuristic learned from everyday ex-
perience, similar to other fluency effects known in the metacog-
nition literature (Alter and Oppenheimer 2009). Alternatively,
the relation between selection fluency and particular outcomes
might need to be acquired in specific contexts, in order to in-
form SoA.
In the present study, we investigated the integration of pro-
spective and retrospective cues to SoA, based on action
selection and outcome monitoring, respectively. More specifi-
cally, we assessed how the contribution of selection fluency to
SoA may change during instrumental learning, as information
about action–outcome contingencies is gathered. For this, we
conducted a multi-study analysis, combining currently known
studies on prospective cues to the SoA.
Our measure of SoA—agency ratings—was obtained by ask-
ing participants to judge how much control they felt over action
outcomes (see Supplementary Material for detailed instruc-
tions). Although the terms ‘sense of agency’ and ‘sense of con-
trol’ have previously been distinguished in the literature
(Pacherie 2008), we will use these terms interchangeably. We
consider the ‘sense of control’ as an aspect of our experience of
agency, assessing the instrumental relation between actions and
outcomes, rather than focusing on the attribution of outcomes to
particular agents (Chambon et al. 2014).
In these studies, three cues to SoA were varied (Fig. 1A).
Selection fluency was manipulated by varying the congruency
between primes, or flankers, and the executed action. The ac-
tion was followed by a variable action–outcome interval (AOI).
The action outcome (one of several coloured circles) depended
on the action and congruency conditions (100% contingent).
Therefore, in each trial, these three cues could be combined to
inform agency ratings (our measure of SoA). Since action–out-
come relations had to be learned anew in each block of trials,
tracking changes in agency ratings across trials indexed the
contribution of monitoring outcome identity (i.e. the colour).
Importantly, the relative contribution of these three cues to
SoA could be modulated by contextual information, such as in-
structions. If participants are instructed to focus on a particular
cue to SoA, e.g. outcome identity, the contribution of that cue to
SoA would likely increase overall. Additionally, this could also
alter the contribution of the other cues to SoA. Within the ex-
periments analysed here, there were two groups of studies that
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Figure 1. Rationale for the study. (A) Prospective and retrospective
cues to the SoA, with their presumed corresponding variables inves-
tigated here (in italics). (B) Schematic of hypothetical results for the
interaction between selection fluency and trial number, assuming
that repeated exposure to actions and outcomes will influence SoA.
As knowledge about action–outcome contingencies is gathered
(across trials), the effect of selection fluency on SoA might: (i) remain
constant; (ii) increase; or (iii) decrease .
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differed in the instructions given to participants about the
agency ratings procedure. The studies in Group 1 instructed par-
ticipants to focus on the relation between actions and out-
comes, that is, to focus on outcome identity. Studies in Group 2
instructed participants to focus on when outcomes appeared,
that is, to focus on AOI (see Table 1 in Methods, and
Supplementary Material for instruction examples).
We suggest 4 different accounts may be hypothesized re-
garding the relation between selection fluency and outcome
identity, which would be consistent with three patterns of re-
sults for how the effect of selection fluency on agency ratings
may change across trials (Fig. 1B). We assume that participants
attended to action–outcome relations, and thus predict that
agency ratings would increase across trials. Even if participants
were not directly instructed to attend to outcome identity (as in
Group 2 studies), we still predict that they would track action–
outcome contingencies, at least implicitly, as it would help pre-
dict the upcoming outcome.
1. Generally prospective. Selection fluency is a heuristic that is
generally used to prospectively inform SoA, independent of
outcome monitoring. In this case, the effects of selection flu-
ency on SoA would remain constant across trials [pattern
(i)]. Since this account does not predict an interaction be-
tween selection fluency and context-specific action–out-
come learning, it would be equally plausible under
conditions in which there is no learning about outcomes,
and thus no increase in agency ratings (unlike subsequent
accounts).
2. Learning to be prospective. As we learn specific action–out-
come relations in each block, we also learn to associate flu-
ency with specific outcomes. Thus, we become able to use
selection fluency as a proxy for causing a given outcome.
This account predicts that the effects of selection fluency on
SoA would increase across trials [pattern (ii)].
3. Prospective effects on learning. Selection fluency impacts on
the learning of action–outcome associations. Learning to as-
sociate dysfluent actions to their outcomes may be im-
paired, relative to learning about the outcomes of fluent
actions. In line with this, sensorimotor predictions of action
consequences can be disrupted by incongruent subliminal
priming of actions (Stenner et al. 2014, 2015). As fluent ac-
tions are well linked to their outcomes, agency ratings in-
crease steeply, whereas dysfluent actions are more slowly
associated with their outcomes. This account predicts that
the effects of selection fluency on SoA would increase across
trials [pattern (ii)].
4. Optimally prospective. We rely on the heuristic of selection flu-
ency as a cue to SoA to prospectively guide our SoA at the
start of a block, when outcomes are not a reliable cue. Once
enough knowledge is gathered about action–outcome con-
tingencies, outcomes will be a more reliable cue to SoA.
Therefore, the effects of selection fluency on SoA should de-
crease across trials [pattern (iii)].
Notably, accounts 2 and 3 predict the same pattern of results
(i), but for very different reasons. While these may be prove dif-
ficult to dissociate, it is worth noting that the ‘learning to be
prospective’ (2) account would not be compatible with the heu-
ristic account (1), since it implies that selection fluency is exclu-
sively learned in a context-specific manner. Moreover, learning
about action–outcome contingencies would be a pre-requisite
for any effects selection fluency on agency. In contrast, the pos-
sible influence of selection fluency on learning (account 3)
would still be compatible with using selection fluency as a heu-
ristic cue to agency in different contexts. In fact, such influences
on learning could be part of mechanisms underlying the devel-
opment of the learned heuristic relation between selection flu-
ency and SoA.
Finally, it is worth considering the role of AOI. This was ma-
nipulated in the experiments considered, in order to increase
variability in SoA, and prevent ceiling effects on ratings
(Haggard et al. 2002; Wenke et al. 2010). No significant interac-
tions have been found between selection fluency and AOI so far.
However, the relation between AOI and outcome identity is less
clear. Longer delays are typically associated with a weaker SoA
(Farrer et al. 2013), possibly due to short AOIs being strongly as-
sociated with the typical windows of motor control. Therefore,
short intervals may generally lead to stronger SoA than long in-
tervals, regardless of knowledge about outcome identity. Yet,
AOI may also compete with outcome identity in driving SoA. A
focus on outcome identity, as instructed in Group 1, may reduce
the contribution of AOI to SoA. In contrast, if participants are in-
structed to focus on AOI, as in Group 2, outcome identity may
become less relevant to SoA. This would predict a reduced influ-
ence of outcome identity on SoA, and thus a smaller change in
agency ratings across trials.
Materials and Methods
Experimental design
The behavioural tasks are described in detail in each respective
publication; the common design features are depicted in Fig. 2.
In Experiments 2–4 (Sidarus and Haggard 2016), the Eriksen
flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen 1974) was combined with the
aforementioned agency task. Participants responded to a cen-
tral target letter, and response conflict was induced when the
flankers were incongruent with the central target (e.g. HHSHH).
A list of the studies included is provided in Table 1. This table
Table 1. Factorial design and differences between studies
Publication Group Experiment
number
Manipulation AOI (ms) Number of
outcomesa
Number
of trials
Number
of blocks
Sidarus et al. (2017) 1 1 Subliminal priming 400, 600 8 64 8
Sidarus and Haggard (2016), Experiment 1 1 2 Supraliminal flankers 100, 300, 500 4 72 4
Sidarus and Haggard (2016), Experiment 2 1 3 Supraliminal flankers 200, 400 8 64 8
Sidarus and Haggard (2016), Experiment 3 1 4 Supraliminal flankers 100, 500 4 64 12
Chambon et al. (2013) 2 5 Subliminal priming 100, 300, 500 4 48 4
Voss et al. (2017) 2 6 Subliminal priming 100, 400, 700 8 56 8
Chambon et al. (2015) 2 7 Subliminal priming 100, 400, 700 4 36 2
aThis refers to the number of outcomes (coloured circles) per block. In Experiment 4, there were 12 coloured circles overall, but only 4 in each block.
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further lists the grouping of experiments, and relevant differ-
ences between the studies. In addition to the differences listed,
experiments in Group 1 used a 9-point Likert scale, whereas
studies in Group 2 used an 8-point scale.
Study selection for multi-study analysis
Of all the known studies that have manipulated action selection
and obtained a measure of agency, three were excluded from
our analysis. One study only obtained agency judgements at the
end of each block (Wenke et al. 2010). Another study only had
two outcomes, therefore did not require much action–outcome
learning (Damen et al. 2014). Finally, detailed trial-wise data
were not available from one study (Chambon and Haggard
2012). Furthermore, we only included the relevant data from the
available studies: for Exp. 2, we only used the data for the half of
participants who gave agency ratings at the end of each trial, as
the other half gave block-wise ratings. Also, we excluded trials
from the neutral flanker condition. For Exp. 6, we only used data
from healthy participants, as the others were clinical patients.
For Exp. 7, we only used the data from the sham TMS (i.e. con-
trol) condition, since the other conditions involved active TMS
stimulation.
Data analysis
Our main goal was to model the trial-wise control ratings as a
function of selection fluency, AOI, and outcome identity, while
appropriately accounting for the repeated measures over partic-
ipants and experiments. We therefore estimated a three-level
multilevel model (e.g. Gelman and Hill 2006). More details are
provided below.
To detect potential differences between experiments, and
groups, we plotted the data for each experiment separately (see
Figs 3 and 4 below). Notably, the absence of instrumental learning
effects on agency ratings seen in Group 2 studies was unexpected,
as it was assumed participants would intuitively track the relation
between their action and outcome colours. This highlighted the
critical difference in instructions, and motivated the grouping of
experiments in the overall multilevel model according to the in-
structions. The exact experimenter, i.e. the person who gave the
instructions, varied across experiments within each group, but the
instructions remained consistent within each group.
Finally, we estimated the effects in separate multilevel mod-
els for each experiment, including all trials from each experi-
ment, confirming the results presented here (see Supplementary
Material).
Results
Considering how agency ratings changed across the trials, the
data presented in Fig. 3 suggest an important distinction be-
tween the patterns of data obtained in the two groups of experi-
ments. In Group 1 (Exp.: 1–4), agency ratings increased over
trials, and the effect of congruency (higher agency ratings for
congruent trials) increased as participants progressed through
the trials, within a block. These patterns seemed largely absent
in the data obtained from experiments in Group 2 (Exp.: 5–7):
Agency ratings and the congruency effect remained broadly sta-
ble throughout the block.
We also considered the effect of AOI on agency ratings. The
data presented in Fig. 4 suggest another important difference in
the patterns of data between the groups of experiments: longer
AOIs led to lower agency ratings in Group 2, but this pattern
seemed to be absent in Group 1.
Before modelling the data, we limited the block length of
each experiment to 36 trials per block in order to prevent any ef-
fects of trial number due to differences in block length across
the experiments included in the meta-analytic model (Table 1).
Multilevel model of agency ratings
We modelled these data with a three-level multilevel logistic re-
gression model (e.g. Gelman and Hill 2006), where the effects of
trial, congruency, AOI, congruency by trial interaction, and con-
gruency by AOI interaction were treated as varying between
subjects and experiments, and as fixed effects (The model did
not converge when we included the congruency by AOI interac-
tion as a by-experiment random effect, so we dropped it.
However, we estimated the full model including this term using
Bayesian, and confirmed our results). Additionally, we inter-
acted these effects with a group indicator variable at the fixed-
effect level. The full fixed-effects specification of this model,
along with estimated effects is shown in Table 2. Our main goals
of inference were the differences in the data patterns observed
in Figs 3 and 4; these effects are highlighted in bold in Table 2.
The use of multilevel modelling was motivated by acknowl-
edging the hierarchical structure of the data, with repeated
measures on individuals, and individuals within experiments,
and the need to include continuous predictors at all levels of
analysis. Additionally, the data were not balanced across indi-
viduals or experiments, because the sequence of congruent and
incongruent trials within a block was randomized, further moti-
vating the use of multilevel modelling. The model was fitted
Fixation
(~3 s)
Prime
(17 ms)
(34 ms)
Mask/Target
(250 ms)
Outcome
(300 ms)
(3 - 5 s)
Agency
Ratings
Congruent Incongruent
Time
How much control? How much control?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Action
(< 1.2 s)
Figure 2. Task outline for the subliminal priming studies (adapted
from Chambon et al., 2013). This outline is similar to experiments
from Group 1. Critically, all studies involve a target, which calls for a
left- or right-hand action. This is followed by a coloured circle (the
outcome), after a variable delay. Participants give agency ratings
over the outcome, at the end of each trial. In studies with supralimi-
nal flanker, targets consist of one of two letters, which appear sur-
rounded by congruent (e.g. SSSSS), or incongruent (e.g. HHSHH),
flankers.
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using the lme4 package in the R statistical programming envi-
ronment (Bates et al. 2014; R Core Team 2015).
Instead of modelling the agency ratings with a linear model,
we treated them as proportions of the maximum rating, and
therefore used logistic regression. This choice also allowed the
model to naturally take into account the fact that the ratings
are bounded at 1 and 9 (for Group 1; in Group 2, ratings were
bounded at 8), and that the data showed a clearly curvilinear re-
lationship between trial number and agency rating (for experi-
ments in Group 1). We also modelled the data with a linear
regression model with a quadratic term for trial number, and ar-
rived at the same conclusions.
We used the following coding scheme for the predictor vari-
ables in the regression model: Group was dummy coded as 0
(Group 1) and 1 (Group 2), therefore all effects in Table 2 without
Group interaction denote average effects for experiments in Group
1. Trial was centred at trial 18, Congruency was coded as 0.5 (in-
congruent) and 0.5 (congruent); AOI denotes the effect of 100 ms
increase in AOI, and was centred at 400 ms and used as a linear
predictor—when using AOI as a factorial predictor, the model did
not converge, and the data presented in Fig. 4 suggest that a linear
effect in these ranges of AOI was a good approximation.
Regarding the main effect of congruency, the model (Table 2)
showed a strong and robust effect of congruency on SoA for
Group 1 (main effect of Congruency), with no noticeable difference
in this effect for Group 2 (Congruency by Group interaction). AOI
did not exert a detectable effect in Group 1 (main effect of AOI),
but strongly decreased agency ratings in Group 2 (AOI by Group,
general linear hypothesis test of AOI effect for Group 2:
b¼0.16, t(7)¼7.83, P< 0.001; Fig. 4 [Obtained using the
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Figure 3. Mean agency rating across participants as a function of trial number, for each experiment (6 1 SEM as shaded area). Top row¼ experi-
ments from Group 1, bottom row¼Group 2. Green¼ congruent, red¼ incongruent.
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Figure 4. Mean agency rating as function of AOI for each experiment (61 SEM). Top row¼ experiments from Group 1, bottom row¼Group 2).
Green¼ congruent, red¼ incongruent.
Integration of prospective and retrospective cues in the sense of agency | 5
model s estimated parameters and variance-covariance matrix.
All tests were computed with a conservative 7 degrees of free-
dom (number of experiments)]. Importantly, there was no sig-
nificant interaction between AOI and congruency for Group 1
(Congruency by AOI), nor for Group 2 (Congruency by AOI by Group).
Although null results should be interpreted with care, these
findings are consistent with the absence of interactions be-
tween congruency and AOI in other studies (Chambon and
Haggard 2012; Sidarus et al. 2013).
Regarding the effect of outcome identity, agency ratings in-
creased with trial number in Group 1 (main effect of Trial), but the
effect was not statistically significant in Group 2 (Trial by Group,
general linear hypothesis test of Trial effect for Group 2: b¼ 0.003,
t(7)¼ 0.46, P¼ 0.66). The effect of congruency increased with trial
number in Group 1 (Trial by Congruency), but this interaction was
not robust in Group 2 (Trial by Congruency by Group, general linear
hypothesis test of Trial by Congruency for Group 2: b¼0.002,
t(7)¼0.78, P¼ 0.46). These effects are illustrated in Fig. 5.
Discussion
The present study investigated the relative contribution of pro-
spective and retrospective cues to agency. Overall, a multi-study
analysis of seven experiments showed a robust effect of the pro-
spective—selection fluency—cue to SoA. These effects were con-
sistent across different instructions regarding the agency ratings
procedure, suggesting a general role of this prospective cue to
agency. The different instructions did, however, modulate the
contribution of the two retrospective cues—outcome identity
and AOI. On the one hand, Group 1 experiments gave instruc-
tions to focus on learning action–outcome contingencies. These
showed an increase in agency ratings across trials, as knowledge
about the outcomes was gathered. Yet, no effect of AOI was
found, suggesting that outcome identity drove agency ratings for
Group 1. On the other hand, Group 2 experiments instructed par-
ticipants to attend to AOI. These did not show a consistent
change in ratings across trials, but did show effects of AOI on
Table 2. Multilevel logistic regression model of agency ratings (estimates are log-odds). effects of primary interest are highlighted in bold
95% CI
Effect Estimate (SE) Z P Lower Upper
Intercept 0.39 (0.13) 2.97 0.003 0.13 0.65
Trial 0.037 (0.0061) 6.1 <0.0001 0.025 0.049
Congruency 0.16 (0.028) 5.78 <0.0001 0.11 0.22
AOI 0.0067 (0.015) 0.44 0.66 20.023 0.036
Group 20.12 (0.21) 20.57 0.57 20.53 0.29
Trial 3 Congruency 0.0073 (0.0016) 4.65 <0.0001 0.0042 0.01
Congruency x Group 0.012 (0.05) 0.25 0.81 20.085 0.11
AOI 3 Group 20.17 (0.025) 26.54 <0.0001 20.21 20.12
Congruency x AOI 0.01 (0.0092) 1.08 0.28 20.0081 0.028
Trial 3 Group 20.034 (0.0096) 23.54 0.0004 20.053 20.015
Trial 3 Congruency 3 Group 20.0093 (0.003) 23.1 0.002 20.015 20.0034
Congruency  AOI  Group 0.0075 (0.016) 0.46 0.64 20.024 0.039
Note. Confidence intervals were obtained using the Wald method (Bates et al. 2014). ‘’ denotes interaction terms.
Group: 1 Group: 2
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Figure 5. Multilevel logistic regression model of agency ratings. Predicted average agency ratings for each Group as a function of trial number
(with 95% confidence intervals as shades around regression lines). Green = congruent, red = incongruent. Regression lines and CIs were
obtained from 100000 simulations from the posterior distribution of plausible parameter values under uniform priors (Gelman & Su, 2015).
Note the progressively increasing effect of congruency on agency in studies of Group 1, but not of Group 2.
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ratings. Thus, for Group 2, AOI drove agency ratings, instead of
outcome identity. These results suggest a trade-off between the
two retrospective cues, and demonstrate the importance of con-
textual influences (e.g. instructions) in modulating cue integra-
tion in SoA. As it is our main interest, we will first consider the
relation between prospective and retrospective cues.
Prospective versus Retrospective cues
For Group 1 studies, which focused on outcome identity, inter-
actions with the prospective cue emerged. In addition to agency
ratings increasing over time, we found a concurrent increase in
selection fluency effects. There was a shallower increase over
time in agency ratings for dysfluent actions (incongruent prim-
ing/flankers), relative to fluent actions (congruent priming/
flankers). For Group 2 studies, which focused on AOI, there were
no interactions between retrospective and prospective cues to
agency. As there was no change in agency ratings across trials,
selection fluency effects remained stable throughout. Dysfluent
actions (incongruent priming) led to lower agency ratings than
fluent actions (congruent priming) across trials. We will now
evaluate the four possible mechanisms outlined in the intro-
duction with regards to our results.
Generally prospective: selection fluency as a general
heuristic
These findings clearly support the ‘general heuristic’ account
described above: Selection fluency can serve as a heuristic cue
to agency, which can be employed in novel circumstances, inde-
pendently of one’s knowledge about action–outcome contingen-
cies [approximating pattern (i), in Fig. 1]. In Group 2 studies, we
did not find a general increase in agency ratings, as predicted.
Nonetheless, selection fluency was an important cue to SoA,
and its effects were similar across trials.
These findings suggest that the relevance of selection flu-
ency to agency is likely learned through everyday experience,
rather than being specifically linked to any given environment.
Regardless of a specific link between fluency/difficulty and par-
ticular outcomes, fluent action selection is more likely associ-
ated with desired or predicted outcomes than dysfluent
selection. These findings are also consistent with the view that
response conflict is an aversive signal (Botvinick 2007), with
negative affective consequences that can affect subsequent
events (Fritz and Dreisbach 2013). Relatedly, many studies have
shown general influences of fluency/difficulty, e.g. in stimulus
processing, on a variety of judgements, such as liking or famil-
iarity (Alter and Oppenheimer 2009).
Learning to be prospective: fluency effects are not
context-specific
The interaction between selection fluency and outcome identity
observed for Group 1 studies might seem in line with the predic-
tion of the ‘learning to be prospective’ account. This view pro-
poses that we learn to use selection fluency as a cue to agency
in a context-specific manner: we learn that fluent actions are
associated with specific outcomes, and come to rely on selec-
tion fluency as a prospective proxy for the action outcome.
From this perspective, there should be no fluency effects at the
start of a block, because there is no a priori knowledge about
how fluency informs SoA [pattern (ii), in Fig. 1B]. This was in-
deed the pattern observed in Group 1 studies (Fig. 5).
However, this account is incompatible with the general ef-
fects of selection fluency found in Group 2 (Fig. 5). In those
studies, fluency effects were present from the start of a block,
and independently of learning about outcome identity, as
agency ratings did not consistently change across the block.
Therefore, the relation between selection fluency and SoA had
to be learnt in advance. Note that this does not preclude the
possibility that the association between selection fluency and
action outcomes could still be strengthened in particular con-
texts, and further enhance the contribution of prospective cues
to SoA. For example, in complex tasks, e.g. sports, as expertise
increases, greater fluency in action selection will typically be as-
sociated with greater accuracy in outcome prediction (Gray et al.
2007). Thus, the experience of fluency might gradually become
an even more reliable advance predictor of action outcomes,
and agency.
Prospective effects on action–outcome learning
The increased effects of selection fluency on agency across tri-
als seen in Group 1 would also be consistent with the ‘prospec-
tive effects on learning’ account. From this perspective,
outcomes that follow dysfluent actions would be less easily as-
sociated with their corresponding action, relative to outcomes
that follow fluent actions. Assuming agency ratings would track
action–outcome knowledge, ratings would increase more slowly
for outcomes that followed dysfluent actions; thus, the differ-
ence in ratings relative to outcomes that followed fluent actions
would increase. Such effects could result from action represen-
tations being disrupted by response conflict, and, in turn, be
less effectively associated with outcomes. It may be adaptive to
learn less about the consequences of dysfluent actions, than of
fluent actions. For example, a novice playing darts who hits the
bull’s-eye at the first throw should recognise that this success-
ful hit may have been partly due to luck. Her lack of practice
with the game means her action selection was likely not very
fluent or precise, and she is unlikely to easily replicate such an
ideal hit.
Response conflict has been linked to lower confidence in
one’s action (Yeung and Summerfield 2014), as the difference in
the accumulation of evidence between the (ultimately) selected
and unselected responses is reduced. This degraded or disrupted
action signal might thus be harder to associate with ensuing
outcomes. Selection fluency can also disrupt sensorimotor pre-
dictions (Stenner et al. 2015), and thus potentially alter action–
outcome linkage. Response conflict may also serve as an
aversive signal, and can alter the valence of ensuing neutral
events (Fritz and Dreisbach 2013). This negative affect could also
impair the associative process. Interestingly, this view would
suggest that selection fluency effects previously found with
block-wise agency ratings (Wenke et al. 2010) could result from
better or worse associative links between particular outcomes
and their corresponding actions.
Importantly, this hypothesis remains speculative, given a
present scarcity of research on how selection fluency/conflict
may influence learning. As the present studies asked partici-
pants about their SoA, it can only offer indirect information
about instrumental learning. Finally, under the instructions to
focus on outcome identity, agency ratings may have been very
low at the start of a block, since participants did not have any
outcome information yet. This floor effect could thus have
masked the general, and typically stable, influence of selection
fluency on agency (seen in Group 2 studies), which then gradu-
ally emerged as outcome knowledge was gathered, and ratings
started to vary. Further research is clearly needed to further test
this hypothesis, namely by directly testing knowledge about
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action–outcome associations, or obtaining more objective mea-
sures of instrumental learning.
Optimally prospective: no reduction in fluency effects
The present results seem to rule out the ‘optimally prospective’
account. Assuming prior knowledge about the relation between
selection fluency and SoA, this account suggests that we rely
most on selection fluency as a cue to agency when other cues
are unreliable/unavailable. An optimal cue integration account
(Moore and Fletcher 2012; Synofzik et al. 2013) would have pre-
dicted that the prior reliability of the selection fluency cue could
have served to compensate for the low reliability of outcome
identity at the start of a block. Its contribution to SoA might
then reduce with outcome learning, assuming agency ratings
would have been tracking outcome identity [hypothesis (iii), in
Fig. 1]. In contrast, results showed either a constant (Group 2) or
an increasing (Group 1) contribution of selection fluency to SoA
across trials. These findings question the use of an optimal inte-
gration across all cues to SoA (Sidarus et al. 2013), although it
may apply when integrating some cues. Current proposals do
not easily account for changes in reliability over time, such as
those found for outcome identity during instrumental learning.
Moreover, it remains unclear how these processes can handle
the integration of cues that become available at different times
within a trial, e.g. prospective vs. retrospective.
Competition between retrospective cues
Returning to the relation between the two retrospective cues,
outcome identity and AOI, it could be argued that the apparent
trade-off, or competition, between the two cues could be par-
tially attributed to differences in the salience of the AOI cue.
Variability may have been less salient in most experiments that
were part of Group 1, as three out of four used only two inter-
vals, whereas experiments in Group 2 always used three inter-
vals (Table 1). However, similarly to those experiments, and
others (Chambon and Haggard 2012; Sidarus et al. 2013), three
AOIs were used in Experiment 2 (Group 1), but no significant ef-
fect of AOI was found (see Table S2 in Supplementary Material).
Therefore, the difference in instructions between the groups of
studies likely played a more critical role in the relative weight-
ing of the retrospective cues.
When participants were instructed to use AOI as a cue, and
given the prior association between short intervals and stronger
SoA (Farrer et al. 2013), this may have seemed a more reliable
cue to SoA, relative to outcome identity. The availability and rel-
evance (given the instructions) of this cue to agency could have,
in turn, reduced the learning of action–outcome associations. It
is worth noting that the learning of action–outcome associa-
tions in these studies could be difficult, even when only 4 col-
ours appeared in each block (as in Exps 5 and 7). In the
subliminal priming paradigm, participants could learn that two
colours were associated with each hand, but could not further
disambiguate those two colours. Outcome colours depended
both on the action performed, and on prime-action congruency,
and this latter information was not available since primes were
subliminal. On the other hand, in studies with supraliminal
flankers, congruency information was explicitly available,
which could have facilitated action–outcome learning. Whereas
all studies in Group 2 used subliminal priming, and three of four
studies in Group 1 used supraliminal flankers (Table 1), one
might wonder whether differences in learning effects across
groups of studies could explain the different role of outcome
identity to SoA. However, in Experiment 1 (of Group 1) an in-
crease in agency ratings over time was found (see Table S1 in
Supplementary Material) despite using subliminal priming, and
having eight outcome colours per block (due to another factor in
the experiment). This further supports a role for instructions.
Nonetheless, while this trade-off may emerge due to instruc-
tions, other contextual cues could also have an impact. A study
which used similar instructions to those in Group 2 reported
both an effect of AOI and of outcome identity on agency ratings
(Sidarus et al. 2013), with no significant interaction. Moreover,
an interaction between outcome identity and selection fluency
was found. However, this study involved a lower action–out-
come contingency (67%), than the studies considered here
(100%). As outcome predictions were sometimes violated, a
stronger intrinsic motivation to attend to outcome identity may
have been engaged. This motivation may have been partially
absent in the studies of Group 2 investigated here, as outcome
identity was fully contingent on action. Alternatively, if out-
come identity is highly reliable, given prior training, this may be
a predominant cue to SoA (Evans et al. 2015). Therefore, interac-
tions among retrospective, or between retrospective and pro-
spective cues to agency, can be contextually modulated not
only by instructions, but also by the requirements of the task at
hand.
Integrating multiple cues
Our findings demonstrate the robust role of action selection flu-
ency as a prospective cue to the SoA. We suggest that prospec-
tive cues serve as a heuristic cue to estimate agency, learned
from everyday life, in which selection fluency is typically asso-
ciated with expertise in a task and, in turn, successful action.
They further highlight the integrative nature of SoA, combining
multiple cues, from low-level sensorimotor information, to
higher-level beliefs. Notably, contextual information may high-
light particular cues, and alter the relative weights of various
cues. These cues may also become available at different times,
thus prospective cues about the action are integrated with ret-
rospective information about action outcomes. While these
may interact in some contexts, they may also make indepen-
dent contributions to SoA (Sidarus et al. 2017).
The cues discussed here are but a few of those relevant to
SoA (Synofzik et al. 2013). For example, the subjective experience
of freedom in choosing one’s actions is considered an important
component of SoA (Pacherie 2008). Choosing freely has been as-
sociated with greater SoA than following instructions (Wenke
et al. 2010; Barlas and Obhi 2013; Caspar et al. 2016;
Khalighinejad et al. 2016; Sidarus et al. 2017). Moreover, the
‘what, when and whether’ model proposes that voluntary ac-
tion involves different components: what action to perform;
when; and whether to go ahead with a planned action (Brass
and Haggard 2008). In fact, SoA is influenced not only by
whether we have a choice in what to do, but also by whether
there is consistency in ‘what’ and ‘when’ decisions being speci-
fied internally versus externally (Wenke et al. 2009). Here,
primes (or flankers) were used to manipulate the fluency, or dif-
ficulty, of ‘what’ decisions. Additionally, in three of the seven
experiments (Exps 1, 3 and 6) included here, a mix of free- and
instructed -choice trials was used, which were pooled in the
present analyses. In free-choice trial participants could choose
whether to press the left- or right-hand key; in instructed-
choice trials they had to respond according to the stimuli (as in
the remaining experiments). Experiments 1 and 6 (from Groups
1 and 2, respectively) involved subliminal priming, and
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Experiment 3 involved supraliminal flankers. Here, we found
consistent effects of the biasing stimuli (primes and flankers)
on participants’ actions (and biases on their ‘free’ choices).
Whereas there was some effect of choice on SoA in Experiment
1, it was not very robust (cf. Sidarus et al. 2017), and choice did
not affect SoA in Experiments 3 and 6. Thus, it remains unclear
which factors may modulate the effect of choice on SoA. More
importantly, for the present analyses, despite differences in
stimuli, instructions and experimenters, selection fluency (i.e.
congruency between the biasing stimuli and the participant’s
action) had a similar effect on agency ratings for both free- and
forced-choice trials (Sidarus and Haggard 2016; Sidarus et al.
2017; Voss et al. 2017). Consequently, the effect of choice on SoA
is independent from the effect of selection fluency (see also
Wenke et al. 2010).
It has also been proposed that SoA is multi-factorial, and
that different cues may influence different aspects of SoA.
Whereas, the feeling of agency is a non-conceptual representa-
tion, derived from low-level, sensorimotor signals; the judge-
ment of agency is a propositional representation, which further
integrates conceptual information, such as context and beliefs.
It remains unclear whether selection fluency, or response con-
flict, might influence the SoA at the non-conceptual or the prop-
ositional level. Selection fluency may affect the SoA through the
emergence of signals from action monitoring processes (see
Sidarus et al. 2017). Such signals could be integrated with out-
come monitoring signals at the more low-level, feeling of
agency (Stenner et al. 2014). It has been shown that we have
metacognitive access to conflict signals induced even by sub-
liminal stimuli, and that the experience of conflict influences
cognitive control processes (Desender et al. 2014). Yet, this expe-
rience of fluency/conflict may be a type of metacognitive ‘epi-
stemic feeling’ (Arango-Mu~noz 2010), which are typically vague
in content and hard to attribute to specific sources (Winkielman
et al. 2015). These epistemic feelings could thus influence other
processes, such as SoA, at a non-conceptual, non-propositional
level. Nonetheless, it remains possible that the influence of flu-
ency/conflict on SoA relies on propositional representations,
with the experience of fluency only being integrated at the level
of judgements of agency. Further research is clearly needed to
clarify the integrative and multi-factorial nature of SoA.
Conclusions
The present investigation has shown that action selection flu-
ency can serve as a heuristic cue to prospectively inform our
SoA. The experience of agency may already begin even before
the action. This prospective SoA may serve as a general advance
predictor of successful action, and to bridge the interval be-
tween action and outcome. Importantly, the SoA requires a
complex integration of multiple cues, from multiple sources,
available at different times. Prospective and retrospective cues
can have independent effects on SoA. Nonetheless, depending
on contextual cues, such as instructions, or task requirements,
the relative contribution of these two cues to SoA may also be
dynamically changed during instrumental learning. We specu-
late that dysfluent action selection may weaken the link be-
tween action and subsequent outcome.
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Supplementary data is available at Neuroscience of
Consciousness online.
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